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ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS OF TENANT SELECTION
PRACTICES IN REGIONAL SHOPPING CENTERS:
DALMO SALES CO. v. TYSONS CORNER
REGIONAL SHOPPING CENTER
WORTH ROWLEY*
DAVID A. DONOHOE**
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, speaking for the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court in 1885, held that under common law con-
cepts of the invalidity of trade restraints, a covenant contained in a
real property deed could not be enforced against the property holder,
where the only benefit to the covenantee was in the elimination of the
covenantor's competition.' Societal changes since then have resulted
in the application of this principle on the federal level in the Sherman
and Clayton' Acts, while profoundly altering the economic framework
within which the principle operates. Leasehold arrangements and joint
venture contracts have taken over the shaping of many business re-
lationships which were formerly created and controlled by deed re-
strictions in a common building scheme. The need to resolve conflicts
between "freedom to contract," and "freedom to trade," however,
persists.
The population shift toward suburban areas that has marked the
twenty-five years since World War II, coupled with the population's
increasing dependence upon the automobile as the principal mode of
transportation, have provided the impetus for the development of the
"regional shopping center" as a new marketing facility. A regional
shopping center consists of a considerable number of small and
medium-size specialty shops (often referred to as "satellite stores")
clustered around one or more department stores. It is the department
store which provides the principal drawing power for the center and
which distinguishes it from the smaller "community" or "neighbor-
hood" centers. The first regional centers were large, and they have
tended in recent years to become even larger, more complex, and in-
variably more expensive to develop.
The principal sources of financing for these centers have been
the large life insurance companies. Because of the size and duration
of the long-term financing commitments, such lenders have generally
* LL B , Northeastern University, 1938; Member of the Massachusetts and District
of Columbia Bars; Partner, Rowley & Scott, Washington, D.C.
** A.B., 1959, J.D., 1962, Catholic University; Member of the New York, Con-
necticut and District of Columbia Bars; Associate, Rowley & Scott, Washington, D.C.
1 Norcross v. James, 140 Mass. 188, 2 N.E. 946 (1885).
. 2 H	 §§ 1-7 (1964).
3 15 U.S.C. §§ 12 -27 (1964).
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declined to finance a project unless at least a minimum number of
long-term lease commitments have been obtained from "blue chip"
tenants such as department stores' The principal tenants, when
making such long-term commitments to the center, in turn, often seek
to obtain and exercise some control over the character of the center,
the activities and even the selection of other tenants. The acquisition
and exercise of such control over the admission of potential tenants
raises important antitrust questions. The department stores stock so
many varied product lines that most prospective tenants are their com-
petitors to some degree, with the result that a decision to deny them
access to the center can be characterized as the exclusion of competitors
from a market.
I. THE Dalmo CASE
The interest of the department stores in controlling the character
of a large regional shopping center to which they have made a long-
term commitment, and the interest of the tenant, anxious to break
into the marketing opportunities presented by the center, recently
clashed in the case of Dalmo Sales Co. v. Tysons Corner Regional
Shopping Center.' Dalmo, a multi-store "discount" retailer of televi-
sions and appliances in the Washington metropolitan area (and there-
fore a significant competitor of the department stores) sought in 1968
and 1969 to lease space for a store in Tysons Corner, a giant regional
shopping center then nearing completion in Virginia, close to Washing-
ton, D.C.
In the initial negotiations, Tysons Corner, a partnership owning
and operating the center, insisted on lease provisions prohibiting opera-
tion as a "discount store," including discount advertising or similar
in-store promotions, both in the proposed Tysons Corner store and in
connection with the other Dalmo stores throughout the Washington
metropolitan area. Ultimately, a lease was agreed upon which provided
that Dalmo would cease any discount advertising or promotion for
any stores or that it would name its Tysons Corner store "Tyco," and
refrain from advertising any connection between Tyco and DaImo,
However, the two department stores which were the major tenants,
Hecht Company and Woodward & Lothrop, had jointly negotiated
tenant-approval rights in their leases and they each proceeded, appar-
ently independently, to veto the Dalmo tenancy. Dalmo sued, claiming
that its exclusion was based on its reputation as an agressive discount-
type competitor, and argued that the exclusion was anticompetitively
4 Parker v. Lewis Grocer Co., 246 Miss. 873, 898, 153 So. 2d 261, 272 (1963).
5 308 F. Supp. 988 (D.D.C. 1970), aff'd, Civil No. 23,951 (D.C. Cir. June 8, 1970).
6 308 F. Supp. at 991 & n.1.
900
ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS OF SHOPPING CENTER LEASES
motivated. Dalmo sought injunctive relief and damages under the anti-
trust laws.
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia
granted a temporary restraining order prohibiting Tysons Corner from
leasing space desired by Dalmo.' After the hearing on the request for
a preliminary injunction, the district court found probability of irrep-
arable injury but denied the application for the injunction on the
ground that Dalmo had not demonstrated the requisite probability
that it would prevail on the merits.'
The denial of the injunction was appealed and affirmed without
change or substantial discussion by the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia.° The nature of the issues in the case
suggest that the decision may have significant impact on the future
development of regional shopping centers, as well as shed some light
on the legal treatment to be accorded group exclusionary practices
under the antitrust laws.
A. Rationale of the District Court
Because it was largely limited to an evaluation of the plaintiff's
chances of prevailing on the merits, for preliminary injunction pur-
poses, the district court's legal analysis is somewhat cryptic. The court
found that there was an evidentiary conflict "as to the motive and
purpose" of the department stores in excluding Dalmo. The defen-
dants contended that the exclusion was not based on Dalmo's discount
pricing practices, but rather on its failure to fit into the "fashion
image" envisioned for Tysons Corner stores. 1° In support of this, the
defendants showed that other satellite stores in the shopping center
did sell at discount prices (as did the department stores themselves),
and that Hecht Company's president found the Dalmo premises to be
"dirty." From this the Court concluded that there were indications
that discount pricing alone was not a controlling consideration.
The court then reasoned that no group boycott constituting a per
se violation of the antitrust laws, that is, a violation not susceptible
of justification on grounds of reasonableness, had been shown." The
basis for this conclusion was that unless there is a showing of "signifi-
cant anticompetitive motives," a group boycott is subject to the rule
of reason. 12
 The court noted that the rule of reason may apply where
7 Id. at 990.
8 Id. at 993-95.
° civil No. 23,951 (D.C. Cir. June 8, 1970).
10 308 F. Supp. at 994.
11 Id.
12 Id. The district court did concede, however, that Silver v. New York Stock Exch.
373 U.S. 341 (1963), may be a per se group boycott case not involving anticompetitive
motives.
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the motives for exclusion are not "directly profit related."" Having
articulated this basic "motives" test, the court outlined the economic
reasons behind the desire of the center and the department stores to
select tenants who would contribute to the future success of the center.
The court asserted that the center could legally grant to a tenant the
exclusive right to conduct a particular kind of business, and then
reasoned that the center's decision to "share" its rights with the de-
partment stores "may very well be deemed to be a reasonable one
under the antitrust laws." Finally, the court stated without discussion
that the intent to monopolize or the existence of monopoly power had
not been shown."
1. The Motives Test
The district court distinguished Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale
Stores, Inc.,' a landmark Supreme Court case involving a retailer who
induced a group of manufacturers and distributors to boycott one of
his competitors, on the ground that Klor's "involved significant anti-
competitive motives" and was therefore a per se case." Dalmo, on the
other hand, in its brief to the court of appeals argued vigorously that
the case was governed by Klor's and therefore a per se case." Neither
view, however, may be correct. Reference to "significant anticompeti-
tive motives" does not appear in either the Supreme Court or court of
appeals decision in Klors. 19 In fact, when the United States, as Amicus
Curiae in Klor's, suggested that it was "consistent with the uncontra-
dicted allegations of the complaint that petitioner was boycotted
because he was the leading recognized price-cutter among San Fran-
cisco stores of the products covered by the complaint,"" the defen-
dants sharply responded that there was absolutely no support for such
a suggestion.' As the Klor's case is stated, it is conceivable (though
hardly likely) that the defendants' actions were motivated by some
personal or political disagreement. Nonetheless, the group boycott
was held to be unlawful per se. Thus, the Dalmo court's attempt to
distinguish Klor's on an "anticompetitive motives" basis is unsatisfac-
tory.
18 Id.
24 Id.
15 Id. In fact, the motion for preliminary injunction was grounded solely on the
asserted violations of § 1 of the Sherman Act, so the conclusion as to § 2 was not
necessary.
18 Klor's v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
12 308 F. Supp. at 994.
18 Brief for Appellant at — F.2d — (D.C. Cir. 1970).
19 225 F.2d 214 (9th Cir. 1958).
20 Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 9, Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale
Stores, Inc. 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
21 Brief for Respondents at 12, Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S.
207 (1959).
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There is a valid basis for holding that the tenants' veto of Dalin°
did not constitute a per se violation under the Klor's rule. Dalmo may
be distinguishable from Klor's on what seems to be an accepted, but
generally unarticulated, principle applicable to "exclusion" cases;
that is, that while cases where the single objective of the boycott is to
injure the competitor are per se illegal under the Sherman Act, cases
where the exclusion is also based upon the necessity of maintaining
some control over a joint venture by the promoters or members may
not be per se illegal. The implications of this principle provide the
focus for this article.
II. THE "SINGLE-OBJECT BOYCOTT" CASES
The Klor's case came to the Supreme Court as the result of the
dismissal of the complaint. Thus it provided a record devoid of any
evidence of other motivation. Nevertheless, the mere fact of the com-
bination was enough to constitute a per se violation. The "wide combi-
nation" which was attacked, however, was an arrangement among the
defendants which had as its object the imposition of restraints upon
Klor's freedom to trade. It may be assumed that the defendants,
having formed a combination the sole apparent function of which was
to injure the competitor, would not have been permitted to prove that
they did so only because Klor's store was "dirty." Thus, the strict
holding in Klor's only condemns combinations having no real function
other than to inflict injury on competitors.
Another per se boycott case which illustrates this rationale is
United States v. General Motors Corp.,' where the defendants, an
automobile manufacturer and a group of automobile dealers, were
charged with having combined to boycott automobile "discounters""
who previously had been dealing with the defendant dealers. This was
held to be a per se violation. The only function of the combination was
to prevent the discounters access to their suppliers. Having intended
to cut off the discounter-competitors, the defendants were not allowed
to contend that the combination constructed for this single purpose
was well motivated, that is, that it was designed to avoid the dangers
of disorderly marketing. Similarly, in Fashion Originators' Guild of
America, Inc. v. FTC," a group of dress designer-manufacturers were
charged with combining to boycott retailers who dealt with "style
pirates" competing with the defendants. This was held to be a per se
violation,' as was a lumber retailers' practice of blacklisting whole-
salers who sold directly to consumers, in Eastern States Lumber Deal-
22 384 U.S. 127 (1960).
23 Apparently, discounters present a recurring problem to full service marketers.
24 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
25 Id. at 468.
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ers' Ass'n v. United States." The sole object of both boycotts was im-
position of an artificial restraint upon the victims' freedom to trade,
thus making the matter of motive irrelevant.
Silver v. New York Stock Exch 2 T seems to have troubled the
district court because it appeared to be a boycott case not ostensibly
evidencing anticompetitive motives, yet a per se violation was found.
However, the case is distinguishable since it involved joint action by a
regulated exchange and its members to terminate the furnishing of
certain wire services to an over-the-counter securities dealer. This
raised issues as to possible exemption of the defendants from the anti-
trust laws by operation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and as
to the "due process" implications of the peremptory manner in which
the termination was accomplished." The discussion of the per se
doctrine dealt primarily with the question of the plaintiff's absolute
dependence on the service." The combination attacked, however, was
an agreement that a group of competitors would deny a vital service
to a competitor. Thus, all that the agreement accomplished was injury
to a competitor. Motive was therefore held to be irrelevant."
All of these single object cases may be characterized as involving
"concerted refusals to deal," wherein the sole and necessary function
of the combination or agreement was the inflicting of injury on com-
petitors by denying them access to suppliers or marketing outlets.
Given these essential characteristics, the Supreme Court has not found
it necessary to inquire into the motives underlying the refusals to deal.
III. EXCLUSIONS FROM JOINT ACTIVITIES
The economic facts of the Dalmo case, however, may be distin-
guished from the single object boycott cases involving "concerted
refusals to deal." The two department stores began negotiating for
participation in the shopping center almost from its inception. 3 ' Their
commitment to participation was considered to be a prerequisite to
the obtaining of outside financing and to the obtaining of commitments
from smaller stores." The leases were to last for 30 years at a mini-
mum rental of $500,000 per year. Thus, it seems accurate to describe
the "combination," consisting of the various financial arrangements,
26 234 U.S. 600 (1914).
27 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
26 Id. at 361
2° Id. at 347-49.
BO Id. at 344 n.2. The defendants in the lower courts suggested a number of reasons
for the termination relating to the integrity of the plaintiff, but failed to offer proof as
to these reasons. 196 F. Supp. 209, 216, 217, 225-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); 302 F.2d 714, 716
(2d Cir. 1962). There was no showing of anticompetitive motive.
31 308 F. Supp. at 990.
82 Id.
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lease commitments, approval rights and so on, as a joint venture, and
the "boycott" of Dalmo not as a concerted refusal to deal, but rather
as a joint venture from which Dalmo was excluded. The shopping
center was a joint marketing enterprise in which a number of competi-
tors and non-competitors benefitted from a volume of customer traffic
which would not be available to them singly. Moreover, this joint
marketing enterprise created a "new competitive force" in the mer-
chandising of consumer goods in the Virginia suburbs of Washington.
Once it has been concluded that the Tysons's Corner Center was
a joint venture, and that the complained of action was simply of
refusal to admit Dalmo to the joint venture, it is submitted that the
application of the per se doctrine must be somewhat relaxed, perhaps
by utilizing the doctrine of ancillary restraints, under which a trade
restraint which standing alone would appear to be illegal may be law-
fully imposed if it is a reasonable and necessary aid to an otherwise
lawful arrangement. A classic instance would be the typical pattern of
self-imposed regulation for the operation of a produce exchange."
The Supreme Court has tacitly recognized that not all exclusions
are per se violations. In the Associated Press case," an association
composed of 1,200 newspapers functioned as a cooperative news collec-
tion and distributing service. The by-laws prohibited providing news
service to non-members and, although the association provided easy
admission procedures for newspapers not in competition with present
members, the procedures for the admission of newspapers which com-
peted with present members were quite stringent. A present member
could make extemely difficult the application of any competitor seek-
ing access to the association's service, but he could not similarly
obstruct a non-competitor. The district court found that this arrange-
ment was "plainly designed in the interest of preventing competition""
and therefore unlawful.
The Supreme Court agreed, stating that these admission stan-
dards, keyed to the single test of whether the applicant was a
competitor of a present member, were "on their face. . .restraints of
trade,"" but endorsed the district court's rule of reason approach."
The Supreme Court also agreed with the district court that the by-law
restricting Associated Press news services to members did not consti-
tute a violation, "standing alone."" Thus, in Associated Press exclusion
33 United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 170 (1964).
34 See Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
35 Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1944).
38 52 F. Supp. 362, 371, (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
87 326 U.S. 1, 12. (1944).
88 Id. at 14.
89 Id.
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itself was not a per se violation, but the Court implied that it may be
condemned as unreasonable if the exclusion-mechanism operated only
to exclude competitors.
A case factually similar to Dalmo, Cameo, Inc. v. Providence
Fruit & Produce Bldg., Inc.," involved a produce market, strategically
located for shipping, storage and wholesale, which was controlled by
a large number of local wholesalers who rented portions of the market's
facilities. The plaintiff was a competing wholesaler who had rented
a portion of the building for its business. The other wholesalers, who
controlled the market's board of directors, caused the market to refuse
renewal of the plaintiff's lease, thus putting the plaintiff at a substan-
tial competitive disadvantage. The court held the exclusion to be
unlawful but reached its decision by the rule of reason approach. Ad-
verting to the "finite limitations" of the building, the court stated that
"reasonable criteria of selection, therefore, such as lack of available
space, financial unsoundness, or possibly low business or ethical stan-
dards, would not violate the standards of the Sherman Antitrust Act""
The only basis for exclusion offered by the defendants was a suggestion
that the plaintiff was financially unsound. This, the court stated, was
"hollow" in view of the evidence; the exclusion from the joint enter-
prise was therefore held to be unreasonable."
Similarly, in United States v. United States Trotting Ass'n," it
was held that the defendant association's exercise of control over ad-
mission to membership did not constitute a per se violation of the
Sherman Act, even though the criteria for rejection went so far as to
include "that the applicant's membership in the Association would not
be in the best interests of the sport of harness racing or would be det-
rimental to or reflect adversely or unfavorably upon harness racing
or the Association."" The court distinguished Klor's on the ground
that it involved a "commercial" boycott.'
Recognition by the FTC of the special legal status accorded ad-
mission requirements for joint enterprise seems implicit in the consent
40 194 F.2d 484 (1st Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 817 (1952).
41 Id. at 487.
42 Id. at 488. As will be discussed below, the court was influenced by the virtual in-
dispensability of access to the building and therefore placed a heavy burden on the de-
fendants to justify the exclusion.
43 1960 Trade Cas. if 69,761, at 76,954 (S.D. Ohio May 18, 1960).
44 Id. at 76,959-60.
45 Id. at 76,955-56. The Dalmo opinion also seems to suggest that the exclusion of
Dalmo should be subject to the rule of reason because the "motives for exclusion are not
directly profit related." 308 F. Supp. at 944. It is difficult to harmonize this characteriza-
tion with the court's conclusion that the veto may be justified as having been necessary
to protect the department stores' heavy financial stake." Id. Obviously, this case cannot
be equated with those involving boycotts based on political motives. The most that
could be said is that the exclusion was commercially, but not anti-competitively,
motivated.
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decree in United States v. United States Aviation Underwriters, Inc.,"
which modified the admission requirements of an insurance under-
writing "pool" composed of a number of competing insurers. The
decree provided that new members be admitted upon approval by a
majority of present members (as opposed to the previous requirement
of unanimity), and that in deciding whether to approve an applicant
the members were to be "guided" by certain reasonably objective
criteria.' The decree thus comported with a FTC Advisory Opinion
concerning the effect of an industry association's code of ethics which
stated: "[i] f association membership is an important competitive
factor, arbitrary or discriminatory refusal of membership to a qualified
applicant...would raise serious questions .... );48
The approach taken by these decisions indicates that there is an
exception to the blanket per se prohibition of boycotts. Once a group
exists, its exercise of control over the inclusion of additional partici-
pants in a joint enterprise is recognized as being a matter entirely
distinct from the "concerted refusals to deal" involved in K/or's and
General Motors." Exercise of such control may more properly be
termed "exclusion of associates," and seems, under the cases, to be
subject to a rule of reason test.
IV. REASONABLENESS OF THE EXCLUSION IN Dalmo
Application of the rule of reason test to exclusion of associates
cases has generally resulted in findings of unreasonableness. The courts
place a heavy burden upon the excluding parties to justify their ac-
tions:
Where, as here, a business group understandably susceptible
to the temptations of exploiting its natural advantage against
competitors prohibits one previously acceptable from hawk-
ing his wares beside them any longer at the very moment of
48 1968 Trade Cas. if 72,571 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 1968).
47 Id. at 85,984. A similar disposition had earlier been made with respect to a
companion suit brought against the other major domestic aviation insurance pool.
United States v. Associated Aviation Underwriters, 1967 Trade Cas. p 72,260 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. I, 1967). Much the same approach can be seen in the liberalization of admission
provisions in the consent decree in United States v. National Wrestling Alliance, 1956
Trade Cas. 11 68,507 (S.D. Iowa 1956).
48 FTC Advisory Op. No. 119, 3 Trade Reg. Rep. 	 17,907, at 20,302 (April 6,
1967).
49 Support for this approach may also be found in Judge Cooper's recent opinion
in connection with Curt Flood's antitrust challenge to baseball's reserve clause:
Concerted refusals to deal have frequently been held per se violations of the
Sherman Act. We are impressed by defendants' argument that the rule of
reason should govern here, however, since it is generally conceded that some
form of reserve system is essential to the very maintenance of the "joint
venture" of organized professional baseball.
Flood v. Kuhn, 309 F. Supp. 793, 801 n.26 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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his affiliation with a potentially lower priced outsider, they
may be called upon for a necessary explanation. The con-
junction of power and motive to exclude an exclusion not
immediately and patently justified by reasonable business re-
quirements establishes a prima fade case of the purpose to
monopolize."
Despite this heavy burden, it may be argued that the Tysons
Corner exclusion of Dalmo is not a per se violation within the As-
sociated Press rule. The department stores' veto power was not con-
fined to the exclusion of competitors, as was true in Associated Press.
In fact, the only other veto exercised was directed at a prospective
restaurant tenant, which could hardly be regarded as a competitor of
the department stores.5 ' Consequently, since exercise of the veto power
was not dependent upon showing that the excluded party was a com-
petitor, and since the veto power was actually invoked to block a non-
competitor, it does not appear that a violation within the meaning of
Associated Press was shown.
Assuming that the exclusion was not a per se violation, the first
point to be considered in determining whether it was reasonable is the
identity of the excluded party.' The court found that Dalmo and the
department stores were in direct competition in a number of lines of
merchandise." However, had Dalmo been a discount movie theater,
the department stores' "temptation to exploit their natural advantage
against competitors," referred to in Gamco, would not have been
present. The defendants would then have had a far lighter burden to
establish that Dalmo was excluded because it was not a quality tenant
whose presence would benefit the shopping center. On the other hand,
a department store is by its nature a competitor of the vast majority
of the satellite stores in the shopping center. Accepting the principle
that the department stores, by reason of their financial control over
who their associates in the enterprise shall be, it would be inconsistent
to then prohibit exercise of the power against any competitor. Such
a right would be illusory at best. Circumscribing the right to control
admissions to the joint enterprise in such a way would be the practical
50 Gamco, Inc. v. Providence Fruit & Produce Bldg., Inc., 194 F.2d 484, 488 (1st
Cir. 1952).
61 308 F. Supp. at 991. Another "discounter," Sun Radio, was accepted as a tenant,
although on conditions not as flexible as those to which Dalmo was willing to agree. Id.
at 993.
62 For the sake of brevity, our inquiry will focus on what actually was before the
district court—exclusion of Dalmo even after it acquiesced with respect to certain
restrictive conditions. Thus, the question of the reasonableness of these conditions
proposed at various stages must be bypassed. As to the legality of the imposition of
competition restrictions as a condition of membership, see Bale v. Glasgow Tobacco
Board of Trade, 339 F.2d 281 (6th Cir. 1964).
63 308 F. Supp. at 993.
908
ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS OF SHOPPING CENTER LEASES
equivalent of adopting a per se rule. Consequently, although the fact
that the excluded store is a competitor of the stores excercising the
veto power should be regarded as significant in evaluating the legiti-
macy of the exclusion," this does not seem sufficient, standing alone,
to support a finding of unreasonableness.
It may be argued that Gamco and Associated Press, where com-
petitors were barred from access to essential facilities,55 involved
unique or monopoly situations, and that the burden of justifying ex-
clusion should be relaxed considerably when there are numerous al-
ternative facilities, such as shopping centers, available. However,
consideration must be given to the implications of the Supreme Court's
opinion in Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp.,"
where in the context of a challenged tying arrangement, the Supreme
Court sounded an apparent warning to those who may rely too heavily
on the absence of monopoly power as a defense to allegations of anti-
trust violations:
The standard of "sufficient economic power" does not .. .
require that the defendant have a monopoly or even a domi-
nant position throughout the market for tying product. Our
tie-in cases have made unmistakably clear that the economic
power over the tying product can be sufficient even though
the power falls far short of dominance ... 67
The implication of this language is that one who withholds some-
thing of discernible value, either conditionally, (as with the tie-in) or
absolutely (as with the exclusion) may not defend an antitrust viola-
tion on the ground that the victim of the withholding could possibly
find the equivalent thing elsewhere. Every geographical location is
unique; the law has long recognized this by permitting suits to compel
specific performance of contracts for the sale of land without any
special showing of uniqueness. 58
 Moreover, there seems to be no basis
for believing that a competing regional shopping center may arise in
the immediate geographical vicinity of an existing center.'" Thus, the
54 United States v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 189 F. Supp. 153, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
See also Note, Concerted Refusals to Deal Under the Federal Antitrust Laws, 71 Harv.
L. Rev. 1531, 1540 (1958).
55 See, e.g., Gamco, Inc. v. Providence Fruit & Produce Bldg., Inc., 194 F.2d 484
(1st Cir. 1952); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1944).
394 U.S. 495 (1969).
In Id. at 502-03.
68 Restatement of Contracts § 360 (1932). The value of participating in this par-
ticular center is further emphasized by the fact that Lansburgh's, another department
store, actually brought suit to obtain specific performance of an option to lease space in
the center. 308 F. Supp. at 990.
58 The prospect of obtaining financing for such a project, when it would be com-
peting with an established center, would seem remote see p. 899-900 supra.
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Dalmo facts appear to support the contention that the center possesses
what amounts to a "geographical" monopoly.
Recognizing that the burden of justification borne by the ex-
cluding party is substantial, it must be determined whether the depart-
ment stores succeeded in justifying the exclusion by demonstrating
that the veto power was exercised because of factors unrelated to com-
petition. One suggested basis, that a Dalmo store seemed "dirty"" to
Hecht Company's president, appears on its face to be highly question-
able. It seems to be an excessive penalty for the center to exclude com-
pletely a store whose alleged defect is "extra-territorial dirt." A well-
recognized principle governing the validity of ancillary restraints not
condemned as per se violations is that they be "of no broader scope
than reasonably necessary."" A regional shopping center normally has
a merchants association composed of tenants who collectively regulate
the practices of tenants. Tysons Corner has such an association and it
would seem that the task of ensuring cleanliness could be effectively
accomplished by the association's regulation of a tenant, rather than
by the complete exclusion of a potential tenant.
It must be conceded, on the other hand, that total exclusion is
administratively far simpler than continuing surveillance of an already
admitted tenant. This is particularly true if the would-be tenant
already has a number of other stores in the metropolitan area, because
conditions at any one store might tend to tarnish the image of the
store at the center, thus lowering the "tone" of the entire center. In
such a case, if the demands of off-site policing would be beyond the
capability of the center's merchants association, then total exclusion
might be justifiable as the only feasible protective device, a device no
broader than reasonably necessary. Such a determination, however,
necessarily involves a weighing of the contemplated harm to present
tenants (for example, a diminution of customer traffic in the center),
against the certain harm to the excluded party (foreclosure from a
significant outlet for its goods). However, this theory could only be
applied if the district court concluded that: 1) Dalmo's other stores
were irremediably dirty; and 2) there was a substantial probability
that conditions in Dalmo's other stores would have an appreciable
adverse impact on the shopping center." Absent such a showing, the
60 One of the two possibilities under the form of lease accepted by Dalmo (but
vetoed by the department stores) contemplated a strict separation in the minds of the
public between the existing Dalmo stores and the "Tyco" store to be run by Dalmo in
Tysons Corner. 308 F. Supp. at 991-92. This would presumably have prevented any
harm to the center from the conditions existing in Dalmo's other stores.
61 See, e.g., United States v. United States Aviation Underwriters, Inc. 1968 Trade
Cas. 	 72,571 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 1968).
62 United States v. New Orleans Ins. Exch., 148 F. Supp. 915, 920 (ED. La. 1957).
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"dirtiness" justification for exclusion would seem both excessive and
unsupportable.
In trying to justify exclusion, the department stores placed con-
siderable reliance on Dalmo's failure to fit into the "fashion image"
concept of the shopping center. However, the elements of this standard
are not readily apparent. Because the exclusionary provisions which
have suvrived the test of reasonableness seem to be those incorpo-
rating relatively objective criteria for admission, and in view of the
general disfavor with which exclusions of competitors are viewed, the
"fashion image" criterion may be too subjective a test" and therefore
too susceptible to abuse."
The Court in the Silver case noted that the arbitrary "star-
chamber" nature of the exclusionary procedure was one basis for find-
ing it unlawful:
[I] t is clear that no justification can be offered for self-regu-
lation conducted without provision for some method of telling
a protesting nonmember why a rule is being invoked so as to
harm him and allowing him to reply in explanation of his
position. 65
Although the Court's decision was limited to the self-regulation of a
securities exchange, its language nevertheless strongly suggests that if
an exclusion is to be justified there should be some opportunity for the
excluded party to be apprised of the basis for the exclusion, and to
either refute the charges or to demonstrate compliance with the joint
enterprise's requirements." In the Dalmo case, it may be argued that
during the course of the lease negotiations notice and opportunity to
achieve compliance were afforded as to discounting and advertising
practices, but as to the "fashion image" objection, apparently no
mention of it was made before the veto. Even if notice had been given,
it is difficult to see how notice of this vague objection would have pro-
vided Dalmo with any guidance as to how to demonstrate or achieve
compliance with the center's requirements. Thus, it would be advisable
to establish a requirement that the excluded party be told the reason
for his exclusion and given an opportunity to debate the point. More-
63 The United States Trotting Assin criteria, quoted at p. 906 supra, appear quite
subjective but approval of these criteria may have been influenced by the fact that no
applicant had been rejected in 5 years.
64 Dalmo asserts that, "'fashion image' was a mere euphemism for the exclusion of
discounters." Brief for Appellants at 29.
65 373 U.S. 341, 361 (1963).
66 Although the analogy is imperfect, federal agencies are subject to similar notice
and opportunity for hearing requirements under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5
U.S.C. § 1001 et. seq. (1964). Prohibition of a particular business because of its "type"
is similar to private zoning restrictions, and perhaps on this basis alone should be subject
to some form of procedural due process requirement.
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over, the basis of the exclusion should be reasonable and not merely
a fabrication or frivolous.
Dalmo's assertions that the exclusion was motivated by a desire
to avoid price competition from a discount store, rather than by any
objection to Dalmo's image, may be challenged. Under the form of
lease to which Dalmo agreed, at least the appearance of discount price
competition would have been eliminated, so that the department stores
vetoed Dalmo even though it had agreed to moderate what is certainly
its most significant competitive practice, the promotion and advertising
of discount selling. Thus, the causal relation between Dalmo's discount-
style operation and the exclusion is not as clear as might at first
appear.
There are evidentiary facts in the Dalmo record, however, which
tend to support Dalmo's theory regarding the basis for the exclusion.
For example, the originally proffered form lease would have absolutely
prohibited Dalmo from operating or conducting in the center "a type
of business currently known in the commercial field as a 'discount
store'," or from conducting a "business continuously selling. . .
merchandise or services at 'discount' or 'bargain' prices.""
It is, of course, questionable whether the department stores
should bear responsibility for originally proposing this lease, but since
the record indicates the existence of a pattern whereby the department
stores, in negotiating leases for other centers, usually included a
specific prohibition against the leasing of space by the centers to dis-
count stores, or in the alternative had a veto power of the type involved
here, Dalmo's theory of the true motive for exclusion cannot be char-
acterized as unreasonable. Thus, although Dalmo's identification with
discounting practices must be accorded evidentiary weight in deter-
mining the legitimacy of the "fashion image" basis for the exclusion,
it is clear that reasonable arguments exists on both sides of the issue."
Another aspect of the justification problem which bears further
consideration is the ability of a single member store to exercise a one-
man veto over the admission of new stores. In Dalmo each department
store had the power, acting alone, to veto any applicant. Although this
veto power was not to be exercised "unreasonably,"" under the terms
of the department store leases, this limitation would not appear to
create any third party beneficiary contract right in favor of rejected
tenants. Neither does it seem that rejected tenants could take much
07 308 F. Supp. at 991 n.l.
08 The argument that Dalmo's agreement to forego discount advertising and pro-
motion negates any inference of anti-discount motivation is also weakened somewhat by
the physical proximity of tenants in the center, tending to promote comparison shopping
even in the absence of any discount advertising.
08 308 F. Supp. at 991.
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comfort from the fact that the principal lender for the center had a
specific damage remedy against any store that unreasonably withheld
its approval."
The United States Aviation Underwriters consent decree'' does
reflect concern over the adoption of a single-veto, rather than a majori-
ty-vote, admission procedure. The single-veto problem is similar to the
"due process" argument exemplified by Silver. Since there is no re-
quirement to convene a meeting of tenants and to obtain a vote of a
majority for rejection of an applicant, there is no exchange of opinion
among the tenants and there is none of the moderating effect on arbi-
trary action assumed to flow from such communication and compro-
mise. Thus, arbitrary and unjustifiable action would be more likely
where an objection does not have to survive the scrutiny of, and be
adopted by, the objector's co-tenants. The practical significance, how-
ever, of the one-man veto would seem minimal. Even if a meeting and
majority vote were required to reject an applicant, each tenant would
certainly be conscious of the possibility that he might some day be
the objector, and would very likely be influenced to respect his co-
tenant's objections. "Log-rolling" of this type would probably produce
the same results as retaining single-vetoes.
CONCLUSION
The facts surrounding the exclusion of Dalmo plainly present an
intriguing laboratory example of the clash between the interests of the
shopping center's principal tenants in protecting their substantial in-
vestments and the legitimate desire of other merchants to participate
—a clash intimately related to the public's overriding interest in free
and open competition. The legal context in which the facts in Dalmo
arose, however, makes it inappropriate to project any firm judgments
as to the correctness of the district court's ruling, for the court was
merely determining the narrow question whether there was a reason-
able probability that the plaintiff would succeed on the merits.
Business realities suggest, and case law appears to confirm that
those involved in a joint marketing enterprise such as a regional shop-
ping center have so large a financial stake in the enterprise that their
exercise of control over the identity of additional participants ought
not to be subjected to any rigid or narrow per se test under the anti-
trust laws which would forbid fair and reasonable control over the
70 The lender's damage remedy is discussed in Appellant's Brief to the court of
appeals. Brief for Appellant at 53-54, — F.2d — (D.C. Cir. 1970). In the case of
Tyson Corner, the financing was a straight loan. If the financing had taken the form
of a loan plus equity participation (a growing trend in life insurance company financ-
ings) perhaps the lender's role in the center would be more active, and the lender would
be more likely to exert pressure to prevent misuse of the veto power.
71 1968 Trade Cas. II 72,571 (SD.N.Y. Oct. 17, 1968).
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admission of tenants. Where the excluded party is to any substantial
degree a competitor of those effecting the exclusion, and where the
denial of admission may have a significant adverse impact on the com-
petitor, the burden should at least be shifted to the excluding parties
to justify their actions on some basis other than a desire to insulate
themselves from competition. In evaluating whether such justification
has been demonstrated, primary consideration should be given to: (1)
whether the objections to the excluded party justify total exclusion, or
whether imposing conditions upon admission may achieve the same
protective effect; and (2) whether the criteria for exclusion are suffi-
ciently objective in character to give the excluded party some oppor-
tunity to demonstrate or achieve compliance with the criteria, and
guard against the possibility that invocation of some vague exclusion-
ary standard may be used to camouflage anti-competitive action.
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